The purpose and objective of this post are to compare the police forces
in
Norway
and
São Paulo,
Brazil, to determine what
factors
lead to effective
law
enforcement,
crime
reduction and
prevention.
Policing involves a large array of activities, that are way
too broad and complex to be all dealt with here, and therefore will
have to be left to future posts. Consequently, only
some of the predominant issues in recent times are dealt with, and
will primarily be confined to issues of concern, and particularly
related to
these two geographical areas, such as
homicide,
terrorism,
ability to respond to demands and
needs,
assaults,
and
thefts
or
robberies.
At
the outset it should be clear that law enforcement forces alone are not
capable of deterring crime. There cannot be any doubt, for
instance, that primary underlying causes of crime, such as
discrimination,
unequal opportunities
and
income distribution,
unemployment,
drug abuse,
etc. will have to be dealt with through
education,
political changes,
changes to the court system,
law reforms,
etc., and the prospects for all that are even dimmer than with respect
to improvements in law enforcement. Such changes, if they
ever
come, take much longer to take effect, than improvements in policing.
These aspects will be pursued in future posts and are
applicable
to practically all nations.
What is generally known as
intelligence-led policing
will constitute the main focus of this post, as it is seen as
the key to deal successfully with the demands and challenges that both
of the two police forces face, currently, and in the future.
Norway
You
would think that a nation like Norway, which experienced one of the
biggest mass killings in history, on
July 11,
2011, with
77 dead, would
have learned its lesson, and taken steps to improve its preparedness,
but you could not be further from the truth. Monday,
November
4,
a
31 year-old man from
southern Sudan killed all the three
people
on the bus on which he was travelling: the 55 year-old
driver, a 19
year-old girl,
and a 53 year-old Swedish man who had been working in Norway, but was
on his way home to Sweden, upon termination of his contract.
The killings
took place near
Årdal
(click on link for map, showing the location)
in the
county of
Sogn og
Fjordane.
Adding to this distressful situation is the fact that this
knife drama hit the same bus service, known as the
Valdres express,
ten years
after
the previous one, that took place in 2003, when the 39 year-old bus
driver was knifed to death, along with an asylum
seeker, who was a passenger. That incident took place at
Fagernes, on the same service, on highway 53. 34 other
passengers survived, as the bus driver managed to stop the bus, before
he died. The 26 year-old killer was declared psychotic and
placed under mandatory treatment. A year and a half later he
was released.
The Sudanese
was to be sent back to
Spain the following day, on November 5.
He
had sought asylym in
Norway last April. His application
was never dealt with because
in accordance with the Dublin agreement it
was to be dealt with in Spain, his first country of entry.
Therefore, he could have been, and undoubtedly should have
been, returned to Spain months earlier had it not been for
how long it takes Norwegian authorities to expel such asylum seekers
from the country.
The
Sudanese
was said to be in such a poor state that he was
unable to
show up for an incarceration meeting with the police
Thursday morning,
on November 7. He was therefore not
interrogated,
yet his
defense lawyer,
Fredrik Verling,
reported
that he had had an
orderly and unproblematic conversation with him.
The
emergency
central, referred to as
AMK, received the
first
notification call at
17:14,
which was first
taken to
represent a
traffic accident. Initially police reported to
have been
informed at 17:50 that a dangerous person was involved, and that they
had established contact with policemen at 17:57, who were (supposedly)
armed.
These men were said not to be on duty, and
that it took them
another 22 minutes to get ready. However, police inspector
Ronny Iden stated at the press conference Monday evening, November 4,
that the patrol had been notified about the incident at 17:38, when
they were 89 km away from the bus. On November 6, the chief
of
health preparedness for the district involved, Jan
Petter Sæbø, announced that the police had informed them around 17:42
that it could be a dangerous assignment involved.
Because of these numerous
log
discrepancies police decided to
undertake an
examination of the logs on November 6, but announced
that they would be unable to provide a clear answer until Friday, at
the earliest.
Police
attorney, Jørn-Lasse Refsnes,
said that, in addition to going through the logs, they also had to
determine whether there were any misunderstandings involved or real
contradictions between the information from the police and AMK.
First,
AMK
failed to notify the firefighters
and the police
right away.
That did not happen, as they readily acknowledged, as the
firefighters got notified
12 minutes after the initial call, and the
police
14 minutes
later.
Serious as these errors are, far worse are the
poor police
response time
and
preparedness
which demonstrate the same weaknesses and failures identified by the
Gjørv
commission in its report, following its examinations
of the
killings carried out by
Breivik
on
July 22,
2011.
Police did
not
arrive on the scene till
18:49,
1 hour and 21 minutes
after having been
notified by AMK. Additionally, this police
patrol, that travelled
89
km by car, travelled 37 km unnecessarily, as they
believed that the
Midnes
tunnel was
closed,
due to maintenance work, which turned out to be
erroneous.
The national highway department stated that the
municipalities, the police, the fire departments, and the ambulances
had all been
informed,
before the summer vacation,
that the
emergency
vehicles could drive through,
even when work was performed.
The
firefighters
and the
ambulance people
made their way
through the 1.2 km long
tunnel,
without
any difficulty. A man, well-informed about both the tunnel work as well as the circulation of
emergency vehicles, told Dagbladet, one of the major Norwegian
newspapers, that police had been using the tunnel practically every day
prior to the triple killings.
It was the firefighters that apprehended the killer, after
they got frustrated by how long it took the police to arrive on the
scene. They had been instructed by police to keep their
distance, and not to do anything till police arrived. The
firefighters arrived on the scene at
18:03, and followed
the instructions till they found the wait for police too long, and
decided to take control of the situation themselves. They persuaded the
killer to come out of the bus, and they overpowered him, and held him
down on the ground till police arrived some minutes later.
According to a statement made by Sogndal police chief
superintendent Åge Løseth, a
directive was issued last summer for weapons to be locked down in the
vehicles when they are on the road. However, Løseth reported
that the police patrol left without weapons from their station
in Lærdal. Subsequently neither he nor the chief of
police for the county, Ronny Iden, wanted to comment about
the patrol taking off without weapons.
Once again there was a demonstration that the
helicopter
preparedness does not measure up, with a
chain of command that is too
long, and which results in it
taking way too long to get a
helicopter ready to respond, when called.
When the
the
police anti-terror force, referred to as
Delta force,
received the order to assist the police in Sogn og Fjordance, the county
in which the killings took place, the Oslo Police operational centre
sent a request to the Operational Defense HQ (FOH) in
Bodø,
located just north of the
Arctic Circle.
While FOH confirmed immediately that a helicopter would be
made available it took
34 minutes before FOH called back to confirm
that a helicopter stationed at
Rygge, an airport
located 60 kilometres (37 mi) outside Oslo, would be
ready to take off 60 minutes
later. Colonel lieutenant Ivar Moen of FOH later
stated that they were well within the
two hour limit to assist police,
established by the "political management". The
rescue
helicopter had been
ready
for take-off at 19:02, but at 19:00 police
called to cancel their request. That Moen himself is not
quite on top of his job is revealed by his statement that FOH had
received the request on
Sunday,
when in fact
the
killings took place on Monday,
November 4.
Not too sharp by an information officer.
Incidentally, this information was found in Police Forum, the
police's own forum, and apparently had not been reported by the media.
The 22/7 Commission Report
At this point, it is useful to point to the so-called 22/7
Commission Report, taking its name from the date, July 22,
2011, when
Anders
Behring Breivik
bombed government quarters in Oslo, which resulted in eight deaths,
before proceeding to the island Ulvøya (literally the wolf island), the
site of the Norwegian Labour Party national youth camp, where he shot
and killed 69 youths. This commission was headed by
Alexandra
Bech Bjørv, a lawyer, and is also referred to as the Bjørv
report. It was presented to the prime minister, Jens
Stoltenberg, on August 13, 2012, a year after the commission's
appointment.
In chapter 1 of this report - Introduction with conclusions - we find
the statement that "A car bomb scenario at the Government Complex and
several coordinated attacks have been recurring
scenarios in threat assessments, as well as for safety analyses and
exercise scenarios for many years." Additionally, it is
observed that it is a fact that through public reports, white papers
and legislative work, the Storting (Norway’s parliament) and the
Government have had security and
emergency preparedness high on their agendas for the past 15 years."
Despite providing detailed descriptions of the many flaws and
weaknesses that led to the disastrous losses of lives and government
installations the report has failed to have an impact on improvements
to police operations and equipment etc. following the release of the
report, with its 31 recommendations.
It also completely
failed to
mention the reported fact that the
Delta force,
the
police anti-terror
force, held a 5-day anti-terror and
anti-massacre drill in the Oslo area from Monday 18th through Friday,
July
22nd, 2011,
the very
same day that Breivik
killed 77 people on Utøya, outside Oslo. The drill
reportedly ended at 3 pm, which speaks for itself about the
commission's own work.
Similarly, despite that Stoltenberg
promised
a raft of new anti-terror
measures and announced new measures to improve security, including
providing police with military helicopters, boosting funds for the
police and improving emergency exercises at all level of "public
administration", just about the only thing that has been forthcoming is
that the new police commissioner,
Odd Reidar Humlegård,
is in favour of reducing the number of police districts from 27 to 6.
He replaced Øystein
Mæland, who resigned on his own accord when the commission report was released in
2012. Mæland is a good friend of
Stoltenberg. The Justice minister, Storberget, also
subsequently resigned, and is no longer in politics.
Ingelin Christine Killengreen, who was the
first commissioner when the Police Directorate (POD) was created in
2000 was
appointed as permanent under-secretary of state in the Ministry of Government
Administration, Reform and Church Affairs
in
2011. Killeen is a
jurist.
In 2001 Killengreen headed a large reform of Norwegian
police, reducing the number of police districts from 54 to the current
27. She had served as commissioner for 11 years when she
transferred to her new post. She had previously served as
Chief of police of Oslo between 1995 and 2000.
Even though the report does not specifically deal with the overall
organization of the police force the report includes a statement that
indicates that to enable police to deal with
complicated criminal matters, in a satisfactory manner, where people
live, "the local structure must therefore be
strengthened through
increased
manpower and
fewer
places of work.
Not a word is said about how
police officers will be brought to the places of crime in a timely
manner.
The most serious shortcoming of the report, however, is that
it fails to set out an
action
plan, despite correctly identifying this as the major cause
for the failure to complete the safety measures agreed upon by the
various responsible government units. Such
a plan would add more weight, and impetus to the recommendations,
and strengthen the likelihood of their implementation.
In the
summary
of this report the word
preparedness ("beredskap") is not
found at all, despite the fact that the name of the department is
Justis- og
beredskapsdepartementet (
Justice and preparedness
department).
It is as if the
commission members wore blinkers, as they have entirely
focused on structural reform, with a sole recommendation to reorganize
and reduce the Norwegian police force to
six police districts,
from the
current 27.
This is purportedly to enable police to deal with
complicated criminal matters, in a satisfactory manner, where people
live. They add that "the local structure must therefore be
strengthened through
increased
manpower and
fewer
places of work.
Not a word is said about how
police officers will be brought to the places of crime in a timely
manner.
The commission makes a very strong and contentious statement in the
report that
"The
police is currently not sufficiently capable of
learning, developing and improving its own activity."
They
fail to indicate how this would be achieved by reducing the number of
police districts (from 27 to 6), nor are there any references
to.effective police forces and models to emulate. This statement was made despite the great emphasis in the report on
learning.
Some of the key and pertinent conclusions of the
final commission report
about the attacks on July 22, simply referred to as "22/7", do,
however, highlight some of the key aspects and shortcomings of the
police, and are therefore set out below. As applicable to the
subject and focus of this post they include:
-
The
attack on the government's block on 22/7 could have been prevented
through effective implementation of already established
safeguards.
-
The
authorities failed to protect the people at Utøya. A quicker
action
was actually possible. The perpetrator could have been stopped
earlier.
-
With a
better work methodology and broader focus PST could have exposed the
perpetrator before 22/7.
However, the commission does not have grounds for saying that PST
therefore could and should have prevented the attacks.
-
There
is not one cause alone that can explain the response - neither what
failed nor what functioned. However, the commission
Kommisjonen mener
likevel å ha observert at enkelte grunnleggende forutsetninger er
avgjørende for etatenes presentasjoner. Where it failed, was primarily
due to:
-
The
ability to acknowledge risk, and to learn from experience, is too low.
-
The
ability to carry out what has been decided, and to use the plans that
have been developed, has been too weak.
-
The
ability to coordinate and to cooperate has been deficient.
-
The
potential in information and communication technology has not been
sufficiently utilized.
-
Management's
ability and will to clarify responsibility, establish objectives, and
to take initiatives to achieve results have been inadequate.
"It
is the opinion of the commission that these lessons primarily are
more about management, coordination, culture and attitudes
than lack of
resources, need for new legislation, organization or preferences.
Last,
but not least: 22/7 demonstrated, with alll clarity, how
individuals
can make a big difference. The commission is of the opinion
that the
recommended initiatives will better enable both society and individuals
to meet future challengesd. They will come. It is therefore important
to tackle the key challenges. It is urgent."
It is interesting to learn from an article in the newspaper
VG, published on
November
11, that while
Sweden,
Denmark and
Finland manage to man a police position, continuously on a 24-hour
basis, with only
six
employees most Norwegian police districts in Norway employ
nine, 50%
more! With a total annual cost of
N. kr. 900,000
(108,037 €) per
man-year
it quickly adds up.
In
Finland
police work
38.2 hours a
week, while the work week in
Denmark,
Sweden and
Norway is
respectively
37 hours,
36.5 hours
and
32.9 hours.
In a
survey
of
emergency calls in
Norway in
2000
there were
one million
police emergency calls. Of these 92%
constituted wrong calls, and only
83,000 callls constituted real
emergency calls, representing
18 calls per 1,000 inhabitants.
Only
19,000
responses were made, representing
4 per 1,000 inhabitants,
and
22.9% of the actual
police emergency calls.
The newspaper
Aftenposten
reported in an
article
on
October 14, 2013,
that
34,000 police
emergency had not been responded to. A committee
established by
the
national police commissioner Odd Reidar Humlegård,
who is in charge of all police personnel, examined 460,000 emergency
calls in 16 of the police emergency centrals between January and June,
2013. Some of the findings were:
- 25% of the calls went
unanswered. However, three of four calls were terminated by
the
caller hanging up within five seconds, which indicates a wrong call.
- 7.4% of the calls, 34,000 calls, went unanswered, even if the caller
waited. That means that 226
emergency calls went unaswered each and every day.
- As with other police services in Norway there were considerable
differences with respect to 112 calls (police emergency calls), if you
got a response. In the quickest police district 92.4% of the
calls were responded to within 20 seconds. In the slowest
district this percentage was 75.5%.
The reason why the examination comprised only 16 of the 27 districts is
that
not all have
digital terminals. That is
not slated till June,
2014.
Until August this year
many of the centrals were manned by only one person during the watch.
As of August there must now be at least two.
The total police force in Norway ia made up of approx. 14,500
employees, of
which approx.
8,000
are
police officers.
However, this latter figure turns out to be fictitious
according to an article in Aftenposten on June 18, 2013,
Teknologirådet
gir norsk politi strykkarakter (the Technology council gives
Norwegian police a failing mark). According to what is known
as
the police analysis
only
5,000 police
officers are assigned to what constitutes real police work.
It was also found that
- Norway has the poorest utilization of police resources among the
Nordic nations;
- Police resources
are scattered across 354
different locations, despite the fact that 90% of all crime takes place in
10 municipalities.
- Operations centres do not measure up. This is particularly
true with respect to information
technology (IT).
The photo below shows the current operations centre, which is said to be 10 years behind its time, and far behind what is found in Sweden, the U.S., the UK, and the Netherlands.
The following photo shows what the council would like to see displayed
in terms of data about events and crime, to enable police to direct
resources where needed. The July 22 commission documented
that manning was poorest at peak demands.
The council emphasized that Norwegian police will not be able to
receive sms, photos, and videos at the operations centres till 2015, at
the earliest, and to transmit these to its patrols. Both
British and American police do this daily. The section below about the São Police Military Police (SPMP) describes what it already is capable of.
The council reacts
strongly to how
little
has happened, more than two years after the July 22, 2011 terror.
The council's technical director,
Tore Tennøe,
stated that "It helps little to buy tablets, hire more people for the
centres when the police is unable to gather and analyze data that's
already accessible by everybody."
3 million Norwegians walk around with
smartphones,
communicate in social networks, and share data. According to
the council, Norwegian police is not even able to analyze its
own data, as it does not even use elementary data tools. As
Tennøe put it: "Any
soccer club is today better at data analysis."
In another Aftenposten article, dated March 12, 2013,
Politiet
brukte 1 milliard kroner på IT i fjor, we learn, as the title
indicates, that the police spent
1
billion kroner (
120,623,491
€) in
2012.
One third of this amount - 348 million kroner (41.96 million
€) - on investments, while IT operations amounted to 700 million kroner
(84.4 million €).
Arne Røksund, who directed the IT analytical work in connection with
the police analysis stated that "one interpretation of the findings is
that the police does not use the technology to change the way of work,
but to patch the way they already have been working. If that
is correct, there is a great potential in using technology in a
completely different way than today." He pointed out that
numerous local solutions in the districts contribute to a lack of an
overall, comprehensive approach to the use of IT within the police.
An article published in VG on November 13,
Her
kommer «prosjekt-politiet» (Here comes the "project-police")
illustrates his findings as it is reported that 930 different projects
currently are underway throughout the country.
230 of these are in
the
Police Directorate
(
POD), in
the so-called change program, and the rest are scattered across the 27
police districts and in five specialty agencies.
A report prepared by Holte Consulting for the Justice and
preparedness department points to a lack of a project office to ensure
control over all these projects.
A new report, called
Response
time and response quality, prepared for police
commissioner Odd Reidar
Humlegård by the police directorate's change program represented the
largest and most comprehensive measurement of response times ever
undertaken by Norwegian police. It measured the time it takes
from notification of an incident till the first unit's arrival on the
scene.
The analysis was based on the GPS positions from
235,000 police assignments,
between January 12 amd May 12, 2013. 22,300 of these were
priority
assignments, and originating through the national 112 emergency number.
The
response times for
the various priority police assignments were:
ALARM: Big and serious incident (bank robbery, shooting) requiring immediate
action, with severral units: 23,7 minutes (189 assignments).
1st
priority-assignment – serious incident requiring
immediate action: 22,5 minutes (2918 assignments).
2nd priority-assignment – requires operational intervention, but can wait:
31,2 minutes (6729 assignments).
3rd priority assignment - requires operational intervention, but has to wait till
higher assignments have been solved: 29,0 minutes
(8370 assignments).
Uncategorized assignment: 31.1 minutes (4180 assignments).
Armed assignment: 39.3 minutes (327 assignments). The higher response time was due
to the fact that the police officer often have to return to their
police station for weapons or protective gear, such as bullet proof wests, shields etc.
Urban area with more than 20,000 inhabitants (60 % of the
population):
25.4 minutes.
All urban areas (80 % of the population):
34.3 minutes.
Sparsely populated areas (20% of the population):
41.3 minutes.
For the
most serious incidents
the
average response time
was
23 minutes.
The
overall
average response time was
29.1 minutes.
The
average
response time varied from 20 to 57 minutes.
A
number of assignments were not registered because of inadequate
registration in the police systems, and to determine whether people's
expectations are met.
The
purpose
of the report was
to make
a system for permanent measurements of police response times.
Response times
measurements are
already
available for fire and health. The measurements
were made through a combination of electronic status reports from
the police and so-called GPS tracking.
These response times are more than double those previously stated by
POD and
Storberget,
back in
2008,
when
police commissioner
Ingelin Killengreen, Humlegård's predecessor, presented
the report
Police to
2020 to
Storberget,
then minister for Justice, and responsible for police. This
was
three
years prior to Storberget resignation as minister, on November 11,
2011, following the
Breivik
attacks on July 22, 2011.
Late political scholar
Hanne Marthe Narud
attributed the disproportional number of controversies to Storbergets
poor planning skills. Storberget, like Killengreen,
Janne
Kristiansen, head of the
Norwegian Police
Security Service (PST) from 2009 to 2012, when she was
compelled to resign, and
Grete Faremo,
who replaced Storberget as Justice minister from 2012 to 2013, when she
was also compelled to resign,
all
have a law degree. Incidentally,
Humlegård
also
is a lawyer. However, at least he seems to have more of an
open
approach and outlook than his predecessor, who in 2008 determined:
"
Response time is unsuitable as performance
requirements. The police will
still prioritize
the most serious incidents regardless
of how long it
takes to reach."
On July 22, 2011 it took police
73 minutes from the massacre started till
Breivik, the perpetrator,
was arrested.
Humlegård,
on the other hand, wants full transparency about how his subordinates
perform. He is supported by the members of the project group,
such as
Anne Margrethe Ruud (53), police chief
superintendent for Lyngdal, a police district that forms part of
Sørlandet, a southern county (cfr.:
Snart
kan du sjekke hvor gode ditt politi er - "Soon you can check
how good your police is").
She observed and offered the following statement to the
police forum,
Norwegian Police: "One improves, and focuses beter, when
something is
measured." More than most, she knows what constitutes good,
and not so
good police performance. She acknowledged that she has been
uneasy
about police not being quick enough, and inadequately competent to
deliver a service at a level that people expect of them. She
added
that it is probably not a bad idea to learn from others.
Ruud
and the committee have visited the neighbour countries to learn how
response times are measured there. In Denmark these times are
posted
on the web, so that people can judge the performance. There
is,
however, no firm requirement in Denmark, nor in Sweden, with respect to
response levels. However,
Finland has a response
requirement of 10 minutes, and
10 seconds with respect to
emergency calls.
Section leader in Hordaland police district, Gustav Landro, seen in the
photo below, together with police superintendent John Endre Skeie,
arranged for the
installation
of iPads in the patrol cars, and equipped the operations
centre with better tools to meet the challenges and demands.
Njål Ladstein, previously police superintendent, who i.a.
has worked five years at the operations centre in Oslo, had the
following to say about police response: "It is alarming that
it has
taken five years before we get quite a different reality description
of the situation in the police."
Last summer he wrote his master
thesis at the University in Stavanger about the police response times,
in which he analyzed 773 assignments. He no longer works for
the
police.
"This is a very important subject. People must know
what they can expect from the police, when they need help.", he said.
Ladstein's master thesis showed that
area,
urban areas, and
number of
police
man-years only
partially account for the large differences.
"The
media and society focus on police cover and officers per inhabitants.
It says little about how many police officers that are
available when
you need them."
He points out Sunnmøre police district, which
has quite a low police coverage, and covers a large and complicated
geographical area, but nonetheless quicker than police districts such
as Follo.
The
police response times are lowest at night, and during the weekends,
even though that is when police has most to do. The reason is
that
many of the incidents are tied to violence and disturbances at
restaurants and bars, where the police often is close by, in patrol
cars.
On Thursday nights till Friday morning the police response
time was only 15.5 minutes, on average.
In daytime, on Sundays the response time increases to 32.9 minutes.
São Paulo Military
Police - an example of effective policing
through the use of technology, policy and management
BBC's video report,
São
Paulo's police turn hi-tech to fight crime (click on link to
view), published on
December 19, 2012, serves as a striking example of how sophisticated
integration of different
technologies,
policy,
and
management
can make
for effective policing, and to greatly reduce crimes within a large
territory, long known for its history of violent and
non-violent crimes. According to Col. Alfredo Deak jr.,
Director of Technology for the
São
Paulo Military Police (SPMP), interviewed in this video,
reported that SPMP in 2010 not only dealt with
43 million emergency
calls, but also has
managed
to reduce crimes by 80% within a period 10 years, an
astonishing achievement.
The state of São Paulo has a
population of more than 41 million.
The state covers an area of 248,209.4 km
2
(95,834.2 sq mi). The corresponding area of
Norway is 385,186
km
2 (148,720 sq mi), or
55.2% greater than that of the state of São Paulo, while the
county of
Sogn og
Fjordane, where the bus killings described above took
place, is 18,623 km
2 (7,190 sq mi),
making up
7.5% of the
São
Paulo territory.
São
Paulo is not only the
largest city
in
Brazil, but also the largest
city proper in the
southern
hemisphere and the
Americas
and the world's
seventh largest
city by population. The metropolis is ranked as the
second most populous
metropolitan area in the Americas and among the
ten largest
metropolitan areas in the world. It also has the largest
economy by
GDP among
Latin American and Brazilian cities.
In
2010 its
population was
11,253,503.
SPMP
is the largest
state police force in the
country, with over
100,000
personnel in its ranks, distributed across several
battalions all over the state as well as within the Greater São Paulo
region (Grande São Paulo) which itself comprises
40 cities and towns.
SPMP
has a fleet of
17,000
vehicles,
more
than 400 boats, and
23
helicopters. The
key device, serving
to track the various
components within this system is known as
Maxtrack, a
GPS/GSM device
along with an easy to use
online
application that can be accessed from
any computer using the internet. Each user will be
provided with a
secure login
to track and monitor their mobile assets.
This device, which is a kind of hand-held computer with
touch screen,
turned into a must-have for Brazilian customers in 2011, with sales
hitting 450,000 units that year, according to research and
analysis company IDC.
But the equipment also helps police officers fight crime, as
it makes
accessing
criminal data banks from the streets much easier.
As you will see from the video this data bank is referred to
as
Foto Crim.
The device is equipped with a built-in
Global Positioning
System (GPS) and an
automatic vehicle locator, which
enables Military
Police officials to track its officers patrolling the streets
so they
can respond to emergencies more quickly. The device is
depicted below:
Maxtrack
The technology is expected to reduce the response time for
190
calls – the
Brazilian
police’s phone number for emergencies – officials
say.
“We believe in technology to fight crime,” says Col. Alfredo
Deak Junior, the director of technology for the São Paulo Military
Police. “
Twelve years
ago, more than 25 homicides per 100 inhabitants
were reported across the state, and today this figure has dropped to
9.”
That is a
drop
of 64%! Actually, homicides in the state of Sao
Paulo went from a high of 44.1 per 100,000 in 1999 to 9.8 in 2011, for
a
77.78% decrease!
In
São Paulo
city, the rate was
9/100,
000 (cfr.
Expats in São
Paulo).
The
world
average is 6
.9
/100,000, according to the Global Study on Homicide
published by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.
The situation in São Paulo is not ideal; however, it is much
better than the national average
of about 22.3 per 100,000.
During the last decade, the
fleet of vehicles in
São Paulo´s state grew from
12
million to
22
million units (2011). There was a increase in car
robberies and thefts last year but the
number of vehicles stolen
in 2011 was
22% lower
than in 2001.
In the state of São Paulo, the
overall investment in the
program reached R$28.5 million (
US$16.2 million).
The device already
has been
installed in
6,000 patrol cars.
The hardware and the software were purchased from and
customized by
MXT
Industrial, a Brazilian company based in the state of Minas
Gerais. The
Military
Police also developed part of the software.
Col. Deak Junior says the
police
needed to find a partner that
could make adaptations to the device used by civilians.
The company had
to create an application based on the interface already used by the
Military Police and install police-specific functions.
The devices used by São Paulo’s Military Police
receive
satellite coordinates.
“
The whole data
communication and positioning system is
independent of the device,” Junior says. “Thus,
even when turned off,
the equipment continues transmitting the information from the patrol
car’s location.”
Another function
warns
the police when the device has been
accessed by an unauthorized user.
MXT develops hardware for vehicle traceability solutions. The
company invested R$2 million (US$1.14 million) in research in 2011,
with revenues expected to reach R$76 million (US$43.2
million).
The
company
started the partnership with the São Paulo
Military Police in 2010, after winning the bid to develop
the
equipment, customize the applications and integrate them into the
Military Police’s current systems.
“We staffed a specific team to work along with the Military
Police’s development team and fulfilled all bidding requirements,” says
Etiene Guerra, an MXT executive. The photos below illustrate
some of the features of the overall system:
Helicopter camera
Maxtrack with display of mapped data
Foto Crim data display
São Paulo operational control centre
“Intelligent” eyeglasses to perform facial recognition
In addition to using the GPS-enhanced equipment, the São Paulo
Military Police has invested in other technologies to support officers
in their fight against crime.
The use of “intelligent” eyeglasses,
is an initiative led by the
organization’s
facial
recognition department. The
goal is to use the
police’s image database to easily identify criminals on the streets.
The
glasses,
which were
imported from
Israel, feature a
video
camera attached to one of the lenses. The
camera captures images and
transmits them to the central police station.
When a face matches that
of a fugitive or a missing person stored in the database,
the
system
alerts the officer.
Each pair of
glasses includes a hard disk capable of storing
thousands of images. The
system can recognize a possible
criminal even
when the suspect is in the middle of a crowd or
has altered his or her
appearance, such as growing a beard or changing hair
color.
The glasses were prototyped and the recognition system
implemented, but tests have shown the recognition rate is still low,
Junior says.
“The
hit rate
today is
85%;
we have
two million photos
and the
system always confirms at
least 10,000 suspects,” he says. “The
technology isn’t mature enough to ensure a high volume of
identification. But
within
a year, the algorithms will offer a 95% hit
rate.”
The
São Paulo
Military Police invests R$180 million
(
US$102.3million)
annually in technology.
Mobile scanners provide an X-ray of highway crimes
In
November
2012 the
Federal
Highway
Police (PRF) also introduced a
scanner that X-rays moving
vehicles in the country’s border states, which is
illustrated in the photo below. The images appear on a
computer screen inside the van, where the vehicles are scanned at the
back.
X-ray scan of a truck
Scanner controls
The equipment, which was imported from the United States, uses colors and contrasts to highlight the differences among materials, distinguishing between solids and liquids, as well as hot and cold items.
There are
five vans
covering the most at-risk areas of the nearly 17,000
kilometers (10,563 miles) of highway in Brazil’s 11 border states.
Sixty-five patrol
officers were trained in the use of the equipment.
Every hour,
at least 300 vehicles
pass through each X-ray
system nationwide.
“We’ll never have enough manpower to inspect 100% of the
vehicles, but the
search for illegal goods has become a lot more efficient with these
scanners,” said
police officer Luciano Fernandes, who spearheaded the purchase of the
equipment for
about R$13 million (US$6.49 million) when he headed the Modernization
and
Technologies Division of the Federal Highway Police.
“The idea is always to bring the equipment to the places where
surveillance
needs to be strengthened,” Federal Highway Police officer Vinicius
Martini said. “In
Florianópolis, we seized weapons, ammunition and electronics.”
Martini said the scanners are like fish hooks that “you throw
into the water
without knowing what you’re going to catch.”
During the course of five months, the Federal Highway Police’s
fishing trip
caught everything from minnows to sharks.
The small fish included the seizure of 18 kilograms (39.6
pounds) of cocaine
in February. The drugs were being transported in the false bottom of a
Fiat, in Três
Lagoas, on the border between Mato Grosso do Sul and São Paulo.
“We wouldn’t normally have made an arrest like this, because
it’s not a
normal trafficking route and the driver was not acting suspiciously,”
said Davidson
Pereira de Souza, the chief of policing and enforcement with the
Federal Highway
Police in Mato Grosso do Sul. “The scanner helps when other police
methods don’t
work.”
The “shark” was a shipment of 406 kilograms (895 pounds) of
cocaine on Dec.
8, 2012. The cocaine, which had an estimated value of R$20 million
(US$9.9 million),
was hidden in a refrigerated truck loaded with beef that was traveling
along BR-463
in Ponta Porã bound for São Caetano do Sul in the state of São Paulo.
Anthropologist Paulo Storani, a researcher with the Rio de
Janeiro’s Candido Mendes University’s Institute of Political Science,
says these new technologies are becoming increasingly important in
crime prevention.
“There are more and more intelligent ways to monitor large
areas and thus improve patrolling operations,” says
Storani, a former captain of the Military
Police’s Special Operations Battalion (BOPE). “But we still
invest in weapons, patrol cars and military personnel rather than in
prevention and training.”
Costs and results
As already seen above "the
overall investment in the
Maxtrack program reached R$28.5 million (
US$16.2 million).", with the Maxtrack reported to have been installed in 6,000 vehicles.
Additionally, we have learned that "
São Paulo
Military Police invests R$180 million
(
US$102.3million)
annually in technology."
From
Safe in São Paulo: Stats & Tatts, dated September 23, 2013, we further learn that:
- 43.2 mil emergency calls per year are routed through 190, the emergency number, constituting:
- 150,000 calls per day
- 15,000 dispatches of PMs every day
- 42,000 interventions
- 310,000 rescues
- 120,000 sent to prison
- 12,300 guns apprehended every year
- 45 Tons of drugs apprehended every year (this number is double last year’s).
The table below, from São Paulo's official statistics (
http://splashurl.com/nwz27gz), clearly shows the tremendous reductions in homicides that have taken place since 1999 through 2012, and having been maintained at these lower numbers since 2007. It is, however, evident that other measures, instituted before the new technologies were introduced, also were instrumental in these reductione. With respect to the other crimes, theft and robberies, the increases in populationa and vehicles must be born in mind.
The overall factors making for these dramatic improvements observed above may be summarized as follows:
* Security budget was increased from $2B to $11.5B;
* 395K illegal guns were taken off the street;
* An emphasis on prevention rather than reaction;
* New police cars and equipment (tablets in each car for real-time help);
* Use of crime concentrations – identifying regions/addresses with the most crime and concentrating police forces there;
* Registering of bad guys – the Policia Civil has a database of 500,000 criminals and 1.4 million photos of these criminals (including tattoos and other identifying characteristics).
The generals were also being replaced by colonels who had entered the army in the early 1970s and whose view of the world had been shaped less by ideology and more by pragmatism.
Concluding comments:
This post is intended to represent the
first in a series of posts that will largely focus on
best practices in various fields that are of great importance to our society, such as policing, education, health, etc.
To improve the performance of a given organization it is essential to first
identify the factors that contribute to its weaknesses etc.
By necessity this post has had to take on a relatively "quick and dirty" form. However, it is hoped that the reported facts and figures that it contains will serve to bring out the
salient characteristics that are essential in an
efficient and
effective organization. It is, however,
axiomatic that
no organization is, or can be,
better than the people that it is made up of,
nor are all people equal,
or can be made equal, even through learning, if the potential, interest, right attitude etc. are lacking. These are important aspects that were not adequately dealt with in the Bjørv report.
As clearly seen in this post the example and achievements of SPMP were evidently not known to the police members of the commission, despite having caught BBC's attention. One of the objectives of these posts is therefore to make these practices known, and hopefully brought to the attention of authorities in various countries where they may be introduced or adapted. If you would like to become an active part of a
blogger network to bring forward these practices, reforms etc., in the given fields, please feel free to make use of the material found in these posts, and help get the ball moving, like a snowball, adding mass and momentum on its way.
Det neste arkivet er Digitalarkivet hvor vi finner at det var to menn som het Knut Bjermeland i 1910: Knut Nilsen Bjermeland, som ovenfor, samt Knut J. Bjermeland fra Sylte. Sistnevnte var som man ser født 24.12.1858, ca. 10 år tidligere enn førstnevnte.
Når man deretter søker Knut Bjermeland i Gravminner i Norge finner man at det kun er Knut J. Bjermeland som er oppgitt som var i live i 1910 og klikker man på lenket vis ender man opp med følgende foto av hans gravstøtte:
Som man ser døde han 4.6.1942. Da dette er påfallende veldig nær datoen som ble oppgitt for Knut Nilsen Bjermelands bortgang - 5.7.1942, vil jeg gjerne motta et digitalt kopi av den del av kirkeboka som viser dette, sammen med hans fødselsdato, slik at man kan være forsikret om at alt er riktig. Selv sjekket jeg Skannede kirkebøker for Vestnes/Vestnes for 1868, men fant ikke Knut Nilsen Bjermelands fødselsdata. Jeg håper dere ved kirkekontoret, som har bedre rede på det hele, vil ha bedre hell. Jeg vil også få opplyst hvorvidt Inger Bjermeland er oppført som hans hustru, eller om det skulle vise seg å være en annen, da de allerede hadde skilt lag ifølge manntallet fra 1949, som sett nedenfor. På forhånd takk.
